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Abstract 
Drawing on perspectives from telecommunications policy and neo-Gramscian understandings of 
international political economy this paper offers an explanation and analysis of the shifting patterns of 
regulation which have been evident in the telecommunications sector in recent years.  It aims to 
illustrate, explain and explore the implications of the movement of regulatory sovereignty away from 
the nation-state, through regional conduits, to global organisations in the crystallisation of a world 
system of telecommunications governance. 
 
Our central argument is that telecommunications governance has evolved from a regulatory arena 
characterised, in large part, by national diversity, to one wherein a more convergent global multilayered 
system is emerging.  We suggest that the epicentre of this regulatory system is the relatively new World 
Trade Organisation (WTO).  Working in concert with the WTO are existing well-established nodes 
regulation.  In further complement, we see regional regulatory projects, notably the European Union 
(EU), as important conduits and nodes of regulation in the consolidation of a global regulatory regime. 
 
By way of procedure, we first explore the utility of a neo-Gramscian approach for understanding the 
development of global regulatory frameworks.  Second, we survey something of the recent history – 
and, in extension, conventional wisdom – of telecommunications regulation at national and regional 
levels.  Third, we demonstrate how a multilayered system of global telecommunications regulation has 
emerged centred around the regulatory authority of the WTO.  Finally, we offer our concluding 
comments. 
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CONCEPTUALISING REGULATORY CHANGE 
EXPLAINING SHIFTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS GOVERNANCE 
 
Seamus Simpson* and Rorden Wilkinson** 
 
Introduction 
Key developments in technology and consumption patterns have ensured that telecommunications, 
more than ever, counts among the most significant sectors of the global economy, having strategic 
importance for national governments throughout both the industrialised and developing worlds.   In 
terms of manufacturing output, the production of telecommunications equipment to service national 
and, increasingly, global markets has provided the means to create an infrastructure for users, nurture 
indigenous manufacturing firms, undertake research and development to stay at the forefront of 
technological change, improve the balance of trade position of the economy, and provide employment 
for a significant section of the workforce.  Telecommunications service provision has become an 
increasingly sophisticated, internationally liberalised and hence commercially lucrative activity – a 
multibillion dollar business, the expansion of which is by no means complete.  Indeed, a burgeoning 
telecommunications sector is regarded as one of the mainstays of healthy service economy, upon which 
future wealth generation and national economic prosperity is deemed contingent. 
 
Traditionally, the telecommunications sector has been characterised by national, and to some extent 
regional, variations in regulation, wherein domestic provision and consumption has been subject to the 
regulatory strictures put in place by state authorities.  However, technological advancements and 
changes in consumption patterns in the sector are now being matched by accompanying developments 
in the way in which telecommunications is regulated.  The extent of these regulatory developments has 
yet to be fully appreciated, in part the result of their recent occurrence, and, in part because they form 
one dimension of a wider system of regulation that has traditionally fallen beyond the disciplinary 
parameters of telecommunications policy.  This paper attempts to go someway towards bridging this 
gap. 
 
                                                           
* Seamus Simpson is Principal Lecturer in the political and economic aspects of information and communications 
technologies (ICT) in the Department of Information and Communications, Manchester Metropolitan University. He is 
author (with Peter Humphreys) of  ‘European Telecommunications and Globalisation’ in Gummett (1996) and has 
published work on ICT convergence and European Union Information Society Policy. 
** Rorden Wilkinson lectures in international political economy in the Centre for International Politics, Department of 
Government, University of Manchester.  He is Convenor of the International Political Economy Group (IPEG) of the 
British International Studies Association (BISA); author of Multilateralism and the World Trade Organisation, 
(London: Routledge, 2000); and co-editor (with Steve Hughes) of Global Governance: Critical Perspectives, (London: 
Routledge, forthcoming).  His work has been published in, among others, the Journal of World Trade, New Political 
Economy, Environmental Politics, the British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Global Governance, and 
International Studies Perspectives. 
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Drawing on perspectives from telecommunications policy and international political economy we offer 
an explanation and analysis of recent shifts in telecommunications regulation.  In doing so, we argue 
that regional and global organisations are now functioning as key nodes of telecommunications 
regulation – organisations which together constitute the emergence of a global system of regulation.  
We argue that this system is eroding national autonomy and diversity in telecommunications provision, 
replacing it with a more unified and standardised structure reflecting the exigencies of information and 
communications technologies (ICT) based capitalism.  Key to this regulatory convergence is the 
promotion of a global policy of liberalisation wherein national barriers to market entry are eroded 
coupled with moves to secure the global ownership of intellectual property and telecommunications 
rights – developments which have, and will continue, to concentrate ownership in the hands of a small 
number of global telecommunications players. 
 
To make sense of the growing global convergence around a single model – what Claire Cutler has, in 
another sense, called a global unification movement (Cutler, 1999) – and central regulative authority, as 
well as the role of regional and global organisation in this process, we draw on the work of those who 
have imported something of the work of Italian social theorist Antonio Gramsci to explain events in 
the global political economy.  Against this conceptual backdrop, we examine the processes by which 
relatively new and still developing regional telecommunications regulatory frameworks are emerging, 
concentrating our energies on the most advanced example: the European Union (EU).  We then 
explore the relationship between the national, regional and global contexts in a new 
telecommunications era by considering the role of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) – the 
emerging epicentre of a wider global economic regulatory framework – in telecommunications 
regulation.  In doing so, we argue that an irreversible movement of regulatory sovereignty away from 
the nation-state, through regional conduits, to global organisations in the crystallisation of a world 
system of telecommunications governance is occurring.  Such a system, we argue, is primarily geared 
towards the needs of large-scale transnational telecommunications companies. 
 
By way of procedure we begin by exploring the utility of a neo-Gramscian framework for 
understanding regulatory change.  Second, we survey something of the recent history – and, in 
extension, conventional wisdom – of telecommunications regulation at the national and regional levels.  
Third, we demonstrate how a multilayered system of global telecommunications regulation has 
emerged centred around the growing regulatory authority of the WTO.  Finally, we offer our 
concluding comments. 
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Gramsci and regulatory change 
The writings of the inter-war Italian Communist Party leader Antonio Gramsci have inspired a small 
community of scholars seeking to better understand the complex of economic, ideological, cultural and 
political factors that together constitute the contemporary world order (see Cox, 1987, 1996; Murphy, 
1994; Gill, 1993; Overbeek, 1990; Robinson, 1996; Rupert 1995; Lee, 1996).  Like Marx, from whom he 
drew much (though not all) of his inspiration, Gramsci was concerned with better understanding the 
relationship between capitalism, its associated social practices and its institutional forms (Rupert, 1995: 
16).  Gramsci was not, however, concerned with international political economy, let alone global 
telecommunications regulation.  Rather, his aim was to better understand the various factors that 
enabled Mussolini’s fascist regime to establish itself within inter-war Italy, and in doing so explore the 
potential for building an alternative society.  Gramsci’s concern with domestic power relations, and the 
relative lack of comment on the international dimensions of capitalism seem to preclude the use of his 
work to explore regulatory movements in telecommunications.  This is not, however, the case.  
Through the transposition of certain of Gramsci’s concepts to the global level – that is, through a 
process of internationalisation – we are able to develop alternative ways of thinking about international 
political economy, and, in extension, telecommunications regulation. 
 
Crudely put, Gramsci’s account of the synergistic relationship between capitalism and other dimensions 
of society led him to develop an understanding of the state that included both the formal trappings of 
government and the wider realm of social life.  For him, it was no longer adequate to talk of the state in 
a limited governmental sense as the embodiment of capitalist interests.  Rather, in order to more fully 
appreciate the terrain in which capitalist interests were expressed, account also had to be taken of the 
private realm of individuals: the education system, religious organisations, trade unions, private societies 
such as the Freemasons and Rotarians, the media, popular culture and the like.  Gramsci termed these 
realms respectively ‘political’ and ‘civil’ society.  For him, it was only by adopting an expanded notion 
of the state that a more complete appreciation of the relationship between capitalism and society could 
be attained.  In his refinement of Marx’s architectural metaphor, Gramsci describes capitalist society 
thus:  
 
What we can do … is to fix two major superstructural ‘levels’ [upon the economic base of 
capitalism]: the one that can be called “civil society”, that is the ensemble of organisms 
commonly called “private”, and that of “political society” or “the State”.  These two levels 
correspond on the one hand to the function of “hegemony” which the dominant group exercises 
throughout society and on the other hand to that of “direct domination” or command exercised 
through the State and “juridical” government (Gramsci, 1971: 12). 
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But this was not the sum of his thinking.  Gramsci attributed a particular function to the role of law.  
For him, law was more than just the means by which order was established; rather, it was one means by 
which a particular, historically specific social order was established.  Law, he argued, functions both 
actively and passively in shaping the contours of social interaction.  Moreover, and in parallel to his 
expanded conception of the state, Gramsci refused to confine his understanding of law to that 
associated simply with state judiciary.  Instead, he extended it to cover ‘the general activity of law’.  
This, for him, ranged further afield than a simple association with the juridical trappings of government 
to include those social laws that shape the private life of people, their morality, customs and belief 
systems (Gramsci, 1971: 195).  For Gramsci, then, law in all of its forms constitutes one means by 
which society could be shaped to meet the changing exigencies of capitalism. 
 
To complete his understanding of capitalist society, Gramsci linked the role of the state and the 
function of law with its economic base.  He deemed the state to be the ‘educator’ of society and law the 
means by which social education is undertaken.  In tandem, the state and law brought about the 
adaptation of society to the changing needs of capitalist production.  To return to Gramsci: 
 
In reality, the State must be conceived of as an “educator”, in as much as it tends precisely to 
create a new type or level of civilisation.  Because one is acting essentially on economic forces, 
reorganising and developing the apparatus of economic production, creating a new structure, the 
conclusion must not be drawn that superstructural factors should be left to themselves, to 
develop spontaneously, to a haphazard and sporadic germination.  The State, in this field, too, is 
an instrument of “rationalisation”, of acceleration and of Taylorisation.  It operates according to 
a plan, urges, incites, solicits, and “punishes”; for, once the conditions are created in which a 
certain way of life is “possible”, then “criminal action or omission” must have a punitive 
sanction, with moral implications, and not merely be judged generically as “dangerous”.  The Law 
is the repressive and negative aspect of the entire positive, civilising activity undertaken by the 
State (Gramsci, 1971: 247). 
 
At first glance, though interesting, Gramsci’s insight into the interrelationship of the constituent 
elements of all that comprises capitalist society seems to offer little to help conceptualise recent 
developments in global telecommunications regulation.  Part of the problem lies in Gramsci’s 
concentration on understanding the complexities of the state (Kenny and Germain, 1998: 15-16).  In 
the absence of a global state, Gramsci’s concepts appear irrelevant.  This is not, however, the case.  We 
can take a lead from Gramsci’s insistence that international relations naturally developed from national 
relations, whereupon a reciprocal relationship between the two ensues (Gramsci, 1971: 176).  From this 
we can posit that as capitalist production transcends the boundaries of the state – that is, it begins to be 
globalised – the jurisdiction of the state internationalises as a reflection of that expansion.  The state is 
internationalised in the sense that its economic base is no longer determined by the exigencies of a 
nationally-rooted capitalist economy; rather, the determining force of the contemporary state lies with 
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the capitalist world economy.  The notion of an internationalisation of the state does not, however, 
require that the physical boundaries of the state creep beyond national boundaries.  Rather, it refers to 
an extension in the jurisdiction of the state – understood in the Gramsci’s sense of political + civil 
society.  More properly, this refers to an internationalisation of political authority (Cox, 1987: 257-8).  It 
follows, then, that the superstructural dimensions of capitalist society will also be reoriented to meet the 
exigencies of global capitalism.  That is, as capitalist production spills beyond the confines of the state, 
a corresponding political and civil apparatus will develop.  Once created, this political and civil 
apparatus acts to smooth the spread of capitalism.  Similarly, law will become internationalised.  No 
longer is the function of law to promote the conformity required of national capitalism, it begins to 
socialise areas beyond the state through the development of international rules, regulations, norms and 
codes of behaviour.  In this way, we can posit that as production becomes increasingly 
internationalised, so too does the social, political and legal apparatus essential for smoothing its 
advance. 
 
We can see something of this internationalisation in Craig Murphy’s utilisation of Gramsci’s concepts.  
Murphy argues that one means of better understanding the development of international organisations, 
the gatekeepers of international economic law, is to explore their relationship with the production 
process (Murphy, 1994: 9).  He argues that international organisations respond to, as well as facilitate 
changes in, the nature of production.  Historically, Murphy suggests, the change from one predominant 
form of industry has generated the impetus for the development of a particular organisation or set of 
organisations.  In turn, these bodies have smoothed the transition from one form of production to 
another.  The transition from textile production to heavy industry in the mid-nineteenth century, and 
later, from the chemical, electrical and food-processing industries to car and aircraft production can be 
seen as having been aided, to some degree, by international organisations.  Similarly, international 
organisations have helped transform the industrial base from manufacturing to information technology 
and services.  As Murphy puts it, ‘world organizations have played a role in the periodic replacement of 
lead industries, a critical dynamic of the world economy since the industrial revolution’ (Murphy, 1994: 
2). 
 
So how does this enable us to understand changes in telecommunications regulation?  From this all-to-
brief and rather crude account of Gramsci’s perception of the symbiotic relationship between 
capitalism and the superstructural elements of political and civil society we can extract an awareness 
that changes in the nature of production are reflected in regulatory frameworks.  These frameworks, in 
turn, facilitate the completion of the movement from one industrial order to another, as well as assist in 
the globalisation of the capitalist mode of production.  Put differently, regulatory frameworks are, at 
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one and the same time, the result of, and agents for change.  For our purposes, we can hypothesise that 
the growing significance of telecommunications will necessarily be reflected in the development of 
transnational and global regulatory frameworks.  In turn, these frameworks will facilitate the further 
expansion of the telecommunications sector.  Moreover, as production in this sector further globalises, 
so too will the legal apparatus for smoothing its advance; and, as this process of globalisation 
accelerates, so will the pressure for the creation of a central regulatory authority.  With this in mind we 
can begin to examine recent developments in telecommunications regulation.  
 
Telecommunications: an historical perspective 
Historically, the development, operation and control of telecommunications has been a state-centred 
activity. The provision of a largely standard system across which voice signals were transmitted was 
supported by the (complementary) twin pillars of natural monopoly and universal service. Broadly-
speaking, the desired outcome of facilitating as many users as possible with a basic telephone service at 
a uniform price could be most efficiently achieved, it was argued, through either state-owned (for 
example, in Europe and Japan) or private, though highly regulated, (for instance, the USA) monopoly, 
the result of the high start-up and roll-out costs associated with providing a fixed-link 
telecommunications network. Telecommunications equipment producers and telecommunications 
service providers, certainly in northern hemisphere markets, were almost exclusively domestically-
based. The provision of international telecommunications services was an intergovernmentalist affair 
which aimed to ensure the development of enough technical standardisation to make the system 
operable and to create an acceptable management structure for scarce airwave resources (Cable and 
Distler, 1995: 5).  Service provision across states was, then, merely a question of co-ordination rather 
than regulation. 
 
However, in the closing decades of the twentieth century a well-documented series of factors 
contributed to the mutation of telecommunications from a nationally-focused to an international, if not 
truly global, sector (Hills, 1986; Noam, 1992; Steinfield, Bauer and Caby, 1994). Key developments in 
technology, such as the digitisation of telecommunications switches and the emergence of fibre-optic 
cable, greatly increased the research and development burden faced by producer firms, prompting them 
to seek a larger, inevitably international, market base to shoulder the cost. The application of computer 
technology to telecommunications created not only the possibility of a new multimedia services 
paradigm, but also pressure from computing firms to break into the closed-shop of 
telecommunications service provision, and from frustrated telecommunications users from the 
powerful multinational business community for them to be allowed to do so. These user organisations 
campaigned for the creation of high speed, sophisticated networks with enough global reach to 
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facilitate their international expansion. In response to this new lucrative market, the sleeping giants of, 
first, telecommunications equipment production, then, service provision, engaged in a series of 
international forays into competitor markets, resulting in a host of strategic alliances and take-overs.  It 
is here that we see the emergence of pressures for a transnational regulatory framework to facilitate 
their expansion. 
 
None of the globalisation of telecommunications business witnessed in recent years could have 
occurred without a sea-change in the regulatory philosophy and arrangements which existed in nation-
states. The complex process of loosening the regulatory strictures which historically governed 
telecommunications markets was underpinned by the emergence of neo-liberal economic arguments 
stressing the merits of liberalisation and free competition. This was witnessed most significantly in the 
US in the 1980s, where AT&T was divested of its regional telecommunications companies, forced to 
concentrate on the carriage of long distance telecommunications traffic and, later, permitted to enter 
the computer services market (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 325). In Europe, the UK government of 
the 1980s, an ideological bedfellow of the Reagan administration in the US, was next to follow suit (see 
Overbeek, 1990).  Likewise, as a result of domestic user and US government pressure, in 1984 Japan 
partially privatised its telecommunications service provider, NTT, opening up its markets to (limited) 
competition (Cable and Distler, 1995: 12). Since then, nearly all governments in Europe, Asia and 
North America have pursued a liberalisation agenda. 
 
The seemingly inexorable liberalisation and globalisation of telecommunications has created two 
important developments in telecommunications regulation. First, international trade and investment, 
historically not an issue of major significance in telecommunications due to closed and protected 
national markets with chauvinistic public procurement policies, has assumed vital importance. Second, 
as it became readily apparent that national regulatory structures and existing international arrangements 
would be incapable of catering for the new era of liberalisation in telecommunications, thoughts turned 
to the creation of transnational regulatory structures at the regional and ultimately global levels for this 
purpose.  
 
Regional Regulation 
It is logical, then, that we should see the development of transnational regulatory apparatuses occurring 
first at the regional level, established on the principle of geographical familiarity and the relative cost 
advantages of spatial proximity.  The EU provides an important example of such developments in 
telecommunications. It was not until the early 1980s that telecommunications began to become a 
significant policy domain for the EU. However, since then there has been a progressive re-regulation of 
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many of the most important aspects of the sector from the national to the European level, with a 
consequent cedence of regulatory control by nation-states. The origins of  the process itself were the 
consequence of the complex interaction between a number of important economic, political and 
institutional factors which are reflected in our neo-Gramscian understanding of regulatory change.  
 
The already highlighted key technological changes in telecommunications and economic and 
commercial opportunities which they afforded were seized upon by a miscellany of corporate interests 
and institutional actors to propound arguments for the transnationalisation of key aspects of 
telecommunications regulation to the EU level. Neo-liberal oriented national governments (most 
prominently the UK), the European Commission, as well as corporate business interests from the 
information technology and telecommunications business user communities, pressed hard for change. 
A curious mix of Euro-centrist industrial policy and economic liberalism arguments were put forward 
to support a redrawing of the contours of the telecommunications sector in Europe.  
 
The European Commission acted as an important political advocate and facilitator for the liberalisation 
agenda of business, in return for which it received very significant institutional aggrandisement. The 
Commission played a key role in underlining the direct and secondary strategic economic and industrial 
importance of telecommunications, embellished with dire warnings of the dangers of lagging behind 
Europe’s main competitors: Japan and the US (European Commission, 1984). The only appropriate 
course of action was deemed to be the liberalisation of telecommunications markets, a call which 
became couched in the wider political-economic project of creating a Single European Market 
(European Commission, 1985) – the two projects were undoubtedly mutually reinforcing (European 
Commission, 1986: 5). In this respect, the roots of a ‘received wisdom’ in relation to 
telecommunications were developed which  gradually gained ground across the EU in the late 1980s 
and 1990s.  A vital element in the solidification of any new transnational context is the creation of a set 
of legally binding arrangements in which a system – and, in extension, particular modes of behaviour – 
becomes embedded.  This was soon to follow.  
 
However, it was also clear that there was significant and powerful opposition to the creation of  such a 
new regulatory system.  This opposition came from a complex of traditional telecommunications 
interests, comprising national member states ideologically opposed to liberalisation and the loss of 
national control of key industries, economically weak EU member states, and monopoly public 
telecommunications service operators (PTOs).  This tension was reflected in the 1987 Green Paper 
proposed by the European Commission (European Commission, 1987) which aimed to push re-
regulation forward through advocating the EU-wide liberalisation of telecommunications terminal 
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equipment and Value Added Network Services (VANS), while guaranteeing member states rights to 
keep the structure of provision of voice telephony as a publicly-owned monopoly, if so desired. 
Subsequently proposed liberalisation measures (directives) in these areas (European Commission, 1988; 
European Commission, 1989) brought the conflict to a head, illustrating the determination of the 
European Commission – backed by corporate business users and tacit support from powerful member 
states such as the UK and Germany – to drive forward the liberalisation agenda. Aware of the national 
member state veto on proposed legislation which existed at the time in the EU, the Commission took 
the tenacious step of introducing both the terminal equipment and VANS directives into law without 
securing the approval of the EU Council of Ministers, a move which survived two legal challenges in 
the European Court of Justice from the more dirigiste member states and required a political 
compromise to be stitched together in respect of the services issue (Schmidt, 1998: 173).1 
 
The power of multinational business interests in shaping both the agenda of the Commission (see Esser 
and Noppe, 1996; Levy, 1997) and the preferences of national governments in telecommunications 
cannot be over-stated. It was argued that telecommunications, whose costs parameters (in terms of 
investment in new technology) required markets much larger than those available in any national 
jurisdiction, needed to be reconfigured into an international arena. However, such a transition 
contained within it huge risks for the nation-state and its established strategic industrial interests in 
telecommunications. Thus, as our conceptual framework suggests, despite the significant cultural and 
linguistic differences in Europe, the EU was chosen as a focal point for this experimental exercise in 
the regionalisation of telecommunications. As the 1990s began, an important addition to the adherents 
of the transnationalisation-liberalisation agenda emerged in the shape of certain large 
telecommunications service providers. These organisations, only a few years previously reticent about 
liberalisation for fear of loss of market share to more competitively fit players from elsewhere in 
Europe and the US, gradually became more confident of succeeding in a liberalised international 
telecommunications market and (thus) advocates of a set of regulations for its governance. The more 
wary EU member states (such as France) also became somewhat reluctant acceptors of the argument 
that national self-interest (in terms of commercial performance, job creation and economic growth) 
could be best pursued in a more internationalised telecommunications sector, even though such a 
scenario contained new risks and uncertainties. 
 
The emerging ‘consensus’ on telecommunications in the EU was legally cemented in two Resolutions 
by all member states agreeing to liberalise voice telephony services and infrastructure by 1998 
                                                           
1 The Commission legitimised its action on the basis of Article 90(3) of the Treaty of Rome which instructs it to take 
rectificatory action to get rid of abuses of dominant position by public undertakings in markets where it is found to exist. 
In the Commission’s view, telecommunications terminal equipment and VANS were examples of this. 
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(European Council of Ministers 1993; 1994). This precipitated, by necessity, the passage of a swathe of 
legal measures forming the regulatory parameters of the new system and representing an unprecedented 
transnationalisation of the European telecommunications regulatory regime (see European 
Commission 1994, 1995, 1996a, 1996b; European Parliament and European Council of  Ministers 
1997a, 1997b). Since 1998,2 the liberalised EU telecommunications system has been operationalised 
and further refined. A major review of  regulation in the communications sector occurred in 1999 
(European Commission, 1999), significantly influenced by the debate launched by the Commission in 
1997 on the possibility of creating a converged European level regulatory structure to cater for all 
information and communications infrastructure and content (European Commission, 1997). As a 
result, a revised more convergent regulatory framework has been proposed to cater for all 
telecommunications infrastructures and associated services provision, though, importantly, the new 
framework will not for the foreseeable future cover broadcasting services content or electronic 
commerce (European Commission, 2000a). The proposal, if agreed by member states, will be built 
around a series of six directives on horizontal regulatory arrangements, authorisations, access and 
interconnection, universal service, data protection and privacy and local loop unbundling.3 
 
The EU thus provides a useful case study of the development of a transnational regulatory regime, 
based on neo-liberal principles and practices. Crucial to the system’s functioning is the relationship 
between the national and European level. While legal powers of enforcement of  agreed legislation rests 
at EU level, ensuring that the system works effectively in practice requires collaboration between the 
European Commission in its role as guardian of the treaties establishing the EU, the European Court 
of Justice with legal powers to force compliance with legislation and, finally, the series of independent 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) established to regulate each national market. Here, evidence 
exists of problems related to a number of matters of transposition and implementation of EU 
legislation, such as licensing procedures, cost accounting systems, carrier pre-selection, access and 
interconnection, competitive advantages enjoyed by the incumbent operator and monitoring of 
consumer issues nationally (European Commission, 2000b). There have been calls, particularly from 
newer telecommunications corporate interests, for the establishment of a European regulatory 
authority (Bartle, 1999).  That said, the current proposal for a European level High-Level 
Communications Group, while in theory independent, will only operate in an advisory capacity and 
comprise members designated by the NRAs. 
 
                                                           
2 Luxembourg (2000), Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland (all 2003) were given compliance derogations from the 1998 
agreement 
3 The directive on local loop unbundling was agreed in December 2000. It is envisaged that the remaining proposed 
directives in the new framework will be ratified simultaneously (European Commission 2000a) 
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It is important to note that the emergence of the EU regulatory apparatus effectively bypassed the old 
co-ordinative regime of the CEPT, a pattern also replicated at the global level with the shift of power 
from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to the WTO (to which we return below). The 
EU, as a transnational focal point for regulation, proved attractive not only for economic and spatial 
reasons, but in terms of exercising political control. The well-established, though often turbulent, 
political-economic project of European integration was a useful institutional context within which to 
propound and establish a new agenda. It allowed national member states to operate within familiar 
institutional territory in which policy issues are often packaged together for bargaining purposes and 
where the ultimate right of veto existed until recently. 
 
Global policy issues in the EU telecommunications 
From the outset, the development and adoption of a concerted EU position in international 
telecommunications fora was ensconced as a priority area (European Commission, 1984), with the 
European Commission assuming the important political role of EU representative in the process 
(Mansell, Morgan and Webber, 1989). An early example of the attempt to establish the new competitive 
agenda of telecommunications concerns the US government and European Commission’s efforts to 
drive reform of the system of international call charging between member countries of the ITU. There 
is clear evidence that in doing this, both parties championed the agenda of multinational 
telecommunications business users as well as liberalised international telecommunications carriers, in 
the case of the US, which was not a member of the system. The US attempted to reduce the ITU’s 
regulatory power in the international domain by advocating that such issues should be the preserve of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
 
In the early 1990s, the European Commission vociferously complained against Telecommunications 
Operator (TO) resistance towards the growth of privately operated telecommunications networks for 
business users and went as far as to intervene in the ITU’s International Telegraph and Telephone 
Consultative Committee (ITTCC) D-series of negotiations, by threatening to require TOs to open up 
their accounting systems to scrutiny. The Commission claimed, with considerable justification, that 
users were being overcharged by telecommunications service providers by as much as $20 billion per 
year (Financial Times, 29 January 1991). Since then, international call charges have fallen dramatically 
(European Commission 2000c4). Nonetheless, the US government has continued to promote the 
interests of  its multinational companies claiming that a considerable trade deficit is accrued annually in 
international telecommunications traffic, due to artificially high rates charged by competitor countries. 
                                                           
4 For example, in the 2000, the average price of  international calls decreased by 15.1% in Europe and the price of 
leased lines for the carriage of national and international traffic fell by 30% between 1997-2000. 
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However, it has been suggested that, due to the use of the ‘call-back’ system (which ensures that calls 
can be routed through locations which have low international call charges), while the US paid out 
US$5.7 billion to other countries in 1996, in the same year its telecommunications carriers received 
nearly US$14 billion. In development terms, it has also been argued that a net transfer of resources 
from the northern to the southern hemisphere as a result of accounting rate differences is a positive 
thing (Cane, 1996). 
 
In recent years, the EU regional telecommunications bloc has played an important part in global trade 
negotiations taking place in the WTO, where a landmark agreement was reached among 69 signatories 
(now 84) in February 1997 to liberalise markets in basic telecommunications services (the Agreement 
on Basic Telecommunications). In line with its economic self-interests, the EU has attempted to 
impose its policy model on the global system, arguing for the extension of the agreement to cover more 
advanced telecommunications infrastructure services related to the carriage of electronic mail, online 
information transaction processing and electronic data interchange (EDI) (European Commission 
2000c: 2). It has been forcefully argued that ‘the EU has very strong offensive interests in services, and we 
must push them forward’ (Lamy, 2000: 2), of which telecommunications represents a significant part.  
It is important to note that EU proposals, put forward as part of the next round of General Agreement 
on Trade and Services (GATS) negotiations would exclude liberalisation of content creation and 
provision, reflective of the recently agreed new communications regulatory framework at EU level. In 
the process, the Europeans have also expressed dissatisfaction with the interpretation and 
implementation of the 1997 Basic Telecommunications Agreement on issues such as exemptions, 
deployed by some signatories, to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle; flexible interpretation of 
what is covered by the agreement; market access arrangements; prolonged phasing in of the 
Agreement’s measures; and market regulation issues, such as licensing, interconnection, universal 
service and the like (European Commission 2000c: 2-3). 
 
In its deliberations on global telecommunications trade systems, there is evidence of the EU working 
hard to ensure a consensus on the benefits of the liberalisation agenda. The Commission’s Directorate-
General responsible for trade has argued that its newly extended proposals will provide many social and 
economic benefits to developing economies (European Commission, 2000d).  Liberalising trade in 
services and creating a predictable regulatory environment for their delivery will facilitate the attraction 
of foreign direct investment and improve the infrastructures for financial services, transport and 
telecommunications (European Commission 2001a). It could also be argued, however, that if not 
carefully monitored by national governments, multinational business interests will benefit more from 
these events than the indigenous economy. In its proposals to the current round of GATS negotiations, 
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the European Commission has declared the principles of the telecommunications model an exemplar 
of how agreements should be formed in other contexts (European Commission, 2001b). It has also 
been argued that it is in the interests of the EU and the US to persuade those opposed to globalisation, 
both within their territories and the developing world, of its benefits (Lamy 2001: 2-4). 
 
Global Regulation 
Like the US, then, the EU has an interest in not only moving the regulatory agenda forward through a 
consolidation of global telecommunications regulation, but also in ensuring that such regulation better 
reflects the needs of European telecommunications concerns.  However, pointing to the development 
of transnational regional regulatory frameworks – exemplified most prominently, though not 
exclusively, by the EU – and the energy for their further development, offers only a snap-shot of 
developments in global telecommunications regulation.  To understand more comprehensively the full 
extent to which a system of telecommunications regulation has emerged we need to explore something 
of the development of a wider global regulatory structure. 
 
Reflecting the changed exigencies of contemporary capitalism, the creation of the WTO on 1 January 
1995 brought with it a deepening and widening of the arena of commercial activity subject to 
regulation.  The WTO’s legal framework is designed to systematically erode exceptions to liberalisation 
by drawing previous exempt areas under GATT rules (the GATT is now one of a series of commercial 
agreements administered by the WTO) – most notoriously textiles and clothing, and agriculture – and 
limit the period in which members can seek exemptions from MFN.  But perhaps the most significant 
inclusion has been the extension of trade regulation to include trade in services (under the GATS), of 
which telecommunications is but one, albeit a crucial, dimension. 
 
Reflecting the changing complexion of industrial economies is not, however, the end of the story. The 
WTO’s creation also brought with it a widening of the arena of trade regulation to include the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and the Agreement on 
Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs).  These agreements have taken trade regulation beyond 
its traditional parameters to include areas deemed to be ‘trade-related’ – areas which, though not 
necessarily relating to tradable entities, are deemed intrinsic to the production process.  Both the TRIPs 
and the TRIMs have strategic importance for this emerging system of global regulation.  Neither 
agreement seeks to bring about a direct expansion in commercial activity.  Rather, their aim is to 
further smooth the transnationalisation process.  The TRIPs, for instance, begins the process of 
securing the global ownership of intellectual property; while the TRIMs goes some way towards the 
liberalisation of investment flows (see Wilkinson, 2000: 56-68).  Crucially, and in a change of practice to 
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the GATT-administered system, as part of the Uruguay Round accords members were required to 
ratify the full complement of regulations contained within the WTO’s legal framework as part of a 
‘single undertaking’.  Exceptions to any of the 29 agreements administered by the WTO at the time of 
accession were not permitted,5 thus cementing the regulatory significance of the WTO as well as 
consolidating the liberalisation process. 
 
Yet pointing to the deepening and widening of the arena of trade regulation does not uncover the full 
significance of the WTO’s establishment.  Also of key importance to the WTO’s legal framework are a 
series of provisions which outline the Organisation’s role in the development of a coherent global 
system of regulation.  These provisions locate the WTO squarely at the heart of a system of regulation 
comprising the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank and a host of other organisations, 
of which the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO – a partner organisation through the 
TRIPs) is perhaps the most significant.  These provisions not only restate the mutually harmonious 
interrelatedness of the work of each organisation, but also remove the potential for each body to 
operate in contradiction to the others.  This is the removal of so-called ‘cross-conditionality’ (see the 
Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organisation to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic 
Policy Making annexed to GATT, 1994).  Furthermore, in the case of the WIPO, they locate at the heart 
of that system the principle of global ownership of intellectual property rights. 
 
Two further developments reveal the extent to which a single regulatory system has begun to crystallise.  
First, the WTO’s legal framework requires that all regional free trade areas and customs unions in 
which member states (such as the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Asia 
Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) among others) participate register with the Organisation and 
conform to its body of rules6 – in doing so, increasing the pressure for convergence around a single 
regulatory model.  Second, the convergence around a single model can also be found in the way in 
which other, non-WTO agreements, have begun to adopt the format of WTO agreements.  The much 
lambasted Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), for instance, was designed around those core 
principles – MFN, national treatment and reciprocity – that form the spine of the GATS, GATT, 
TRIMs and TRIPs (Wilkinson, 1999: 181; 2000: 43-51).   
 
                                                           
5 That said, members can request exceptions to the GATS by lodging them on the so-called ‘negative list’ during 
accession negotiations.  Further exemptions can only be made by requesting an MFN waiver from the Ministerial 
Conference. 
6 See Article XXIV of the GATT. 
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The WTO and Telecommunications 
It is as part of this wider framework that we find moves to develop a global system of 
telecommunications regulation.  The completion of the Uruguay Round witnessed a series of limited 
commitments to liberalise telecommunications contained in the WTO’s legal framework, under the 
auspices of two annexes to the GATS and a Ministerial Decision on Negotiations on Basic 
Telecommunications.  These provisions were intended to begin the process of liberalising the 
telecommunications sector across the Organisation’s members, and set out a framework for future 
negotiations directed at accelerating the liberalisation process. 
 
Two features of the WTO’s provisions on telecommunications require elaboration.  The first is 
institutional and relates to the nesting of institutions centred around the WTO in the development of a 
system of global regulation.  Like the TRIPs, the GATS makes provision for the development of 
relations with other organisations in instances when to do so is of benefit to the overall objectives of 
the WTO (Article XXVI of the GATS).  This provision is modified by paragraphs 7 (a) and (b) of the 
GATS annex on Telecommunications.  Here reference is made to the work of others organisations 
both inter- and non-governmental.  Of these, only two are mentioned by name – the ITU and the 
International Organisation of Standards (IOS) – albeit that the ITU is given greater emphasis.  The 
provisions do not specify the nature of any future relationship between the organisations; rather, they 
open up space for the future development of a meaningful relationship by recognising the importance 
of the ITU and IOS in nurturing an international standards regime and the potential for such a regime 
to be utilised by the WTO.  The potential exists, then, for the ITU and the IOS to be drawn into an 
institutional complex wherein their prior work and expertise is utilised as the platform upon which a 
process of standardisation is initiated. 
 
Second, the annex to the GATS also contains a commitment to take further liberalisation in 
telecommunications by establishing the Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications (NGBT – 
since replaced by the Group on Basic Telecommunications (GBT)).  Part of this commitment involved 
the establishment of a surveillance capacity for the NGBT designed to ensure that in the period 
between the completion of the Uruguay Round accords and the completion of negotiations on basic 
telecommunications, member states did not implement measures enabling them to develop or increase 
an advantage during the negotiations (such as by imposing a more discriminatory system which would 
then be the subject of negotiation).7  But these surveillance activities also ensure that the process of 
standardisation is given additional impetus as the telecommunications regimes of nation-states are 
opened up to minute scrutiny.  As is well-known, these provisions laid the foundations for the 
                                                           
7 Paragraph 7 of the Ministerial Decision on Basic Telecommunications. 
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conclusion of the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications on 15 February 1997, with an entry into 
force date of 5 February 1998 (see Blouin, 2000). 
 
The effect of the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, albeit for some modest in the extent of its 
liberalisation, has been to deepen the extent to which telecommunications regulation is incorporated in 
the WTO’s regulatory system.  Coupled with the potential for meaningful co-operation to develop 
between the WTO and the ITU and IOS, recent moves have embedded the telecommunications 
regulation in a global framework and represent a significant development in the general movement of 
regulatory sovereignty away from national authorities, through regional conduits, to a global system.  
Moreover, the mechanisms put in place for the further liberalisation and standardisation of this sector 
will consolidation this movement further. 
 
The WTO’s significance, then, lies in its organic structure.  This structure is created such that it draws 
together a range of organisations into a constellation of bodies, each working in concert to promote a 
particular model of regulation.  This system comprises not only global bodies such as the IMF, World 
Bank, WIPO, ITU and IOS, but also the regional projects underway in Europe, North America, the 
Asia-Pacific and elsewhere.  For us, this movement represents a development of the superstructural 
elements of political authority necessary to assist in the mutation of capitalism.  Further weight is given 
to this when we look at the content of the system of regulation administered by the WTO.  We see in 
this framework a reflection of the changed exigencies of contemporary capitalism.  The inclusion of the 
GATS and the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, as well as the incorporation of the TRIPs 
and TRIMs provide ample illustration.  In extension, it is reasonable to suppose that further 
developments in this system of regulation will seek to meet the regulatory requirements of ICT-based 
capitalism, among others.  Indeed, much of the tension that currently afflicts the WTO centres around 
a push by industrial states for a move into global regulation on government procurement, investment, 
information technology, biotechnology, telecommunications, and services, and resistance to such 
moves by developing countries whose interests lie in securing the implementation of existing 
agreements and issues of special and differential treatment (Wilkinson, 2001). 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we argue that insight into regulatory development and change can be gleaned by utilising 
something of Gramsci’s concepts.  We see the development of regulation as a necessary reflection of 
the changing needs of capitalism.  There are two dimensions to this.  First, as pressures to move 
beyond national markets build, so too will those for the development of a supporting regulatory 
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framework.  Second, the content of this regulation will reflect the needs of transnational capitalism and, 
in extension, smooth its advance. 
 
Such a framework enables us to offer an interpretation of recent changes in telecommunications by 
locating them within wider global developments.  What we see emerging is a complex multilayered 
system wherein regulatory sovereignty is passing from the nation-state through regional bodies to 
global organisations.  This regulatory movement is, however, incomplete.  The WTO has begun to set 
out the parameters of a global telecommunications framework, but significant obstacles remain.  These 
obstacles lie not only in the current tension between developing countries and their industrial 
counterparts, but also in the nature of ICT-based capitalism, which has yet to be fully established. 
 
The consequences of the development of a new, more convergent system of telecommunications 
regulation are only beginning to emerge.  For instance, the possible extension of the WTO’s remit to 
include more content-rich communications services, already being propounded by the EU and US, will 
herald intense negotiations and may be difficult to achieve. Regulatory approaches to these value-added 
elements of communications services content differ markedly, even among the most enthusiastic neo-
liberal states.  This of course says nothing of the lack of an infrastructural capacity in developing states 
(Schiller, 1999). Here, a lot will hinge on the realisation of infrastructural and economic welfare gains 
promised so confidently and vociferously by those advocating liberalisation.  That said, it remains the 
case that the development of a regulatory framework favours those lead industrial states with a 
burgeoning interest in defining the parameters of telecommunications regulation.  It does not favour 
those developing states whose principal economic interests lie in seeking renewed ways in which to 
improve the well-being of their populations and who will, inevitably, be left behind in the race for 
market position in the digital era. 
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